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This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice
functions according to Kelly’s preference extension, which prescribes that
one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements
of the former are preferred to all elements of the latter. It is shown that
set-monotonicity—a new variant of Maskin-monotonicity—implies Kelly-
strategyproofness in comprehensive subdomains of the linear domain. In-
terestingly, there are a handful of appealing Condorcet extensions—such as
the top cycle, the minimal covering set, and the bipartisan set—that satisfy
set-monotonicity even in the unrestricted linear domain, thereby answering
questions raised independently by Barbera` (1977a) and Kelly (1977).
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1. Introduction
One of the central results in microeconomic theory states that every non-trivial so-
cial choice function (SCF)—a function mapping individual preferences to a collective
choice—is susceptible to strategic manipulation (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).
However, the classic theorem by Gibbard and Satterthwaite only applies to resolute, i.e.,
single-valued, SCFs. The notion of a resolute SCF is rather restricted and artificial.1
For example, consider a situation with two agents and two alternatives such that each
1For instance, Ga¨rdenfors (1976) claims that “[resoluteness] is a rather restrictive and unnatural as-
sumption.” In a similar vein, Kelly (1977) writes that “the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [. . . ] uses
an assumption of singlevaluedness which is unreasonable” and Taylor (2005) that “If there is a weak-
ness to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, it is the assumption that winners are unique.” This senti-
ment is echoed by various other authors (see, e.g., Barbera`, 1977b; Feldman, 1979b; Bandyopadhyay,
1983a,b; Duggan and Schwartz, 2000; Nehring, 2000; Ching and Zhou, 2002).
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agent prefers a different alternative. The problem is not that a resolute SCF has to pick
a single alternative (which is a well-motivated practical requirement), but that it has to
pick a single alternative based on the individual preferences alone (see also, Kelly, 1977).
As a consequence, resoluteness is at variance with elementary notions of fairness such as
neutrality and anonymity.
In order to remedy this shortcoming, Gibbard (1977) went on to characterize the class
of strategyproof social decision schemes (SDSs), i.e., aggregation functions that yield
probability distributions over the set of alternatives rather than single alternatives (see
also Gibbard, 1978; Barbera`, 1979). This class consists of rather degenerate SDSs and
Gibbard’s characterization is therefore often interpreted as another impossibility result.
However, Gibbard’s theorem rests on unusually strong assumptions with respect to the
agents’ preferences. In contrast to the traditional setup in social choice theory, which
typically only involves ordinal preferences, his result relies on the expected utility axioms
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), and hence on the existence of linear utility
functions, in order to compare lotteries over alternatives.
The gap between Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s theorem for resolute SCFs and
Gibbard’s theorem for SDSs has been filled by a number of impossibility re-
sults with varying underlying notions of how to compare sets of alternatives with
each other (e.g., Ga¨rdenfors, 1976; Barbera`, 1977a,b; Kelly, 1977; Feldman, 1979a;
MacIntyre and Pattanaik, 1981; Bandyopadhyay, 1982, 1983b; Duggan and Schwartz,
2000; Barbera` et al., 2001; Ching and Zhou, 2002; Sato, 2008; Umezawa, 2009), many
of which are surveyed by Taylor (2005) and Barbera` (2010). In this paper, we will be
concerned with the one of the weakest (and therefore least controversial) preference ex-
tensions from alternatives to sets due to Kelly (1977). According to this definition, a
set of alternatives is weakly preferred to another set of alternatives if all elements of
the former are weakly preferred to all elements of the latter. A nice aspect of Kelly’s
preference extension is that its underlying behavioral assumptions are quite minimalistic
(which strengthens impossibility results), yet reasonable enough to motivate meaning-
ful positive results. Kelly’s extension models that the agents are complete unaware of
the tie-breaking mechanism that is used to eventually pick a single alternative. The
question pursued in this paper is whether this uncertainty can be exploited to achieve
strategyproofness.
Barbera` (1977a) and Kelly (1977) have shown independently that all non-trivial SCFs
that are rationalizable via a quasi-transitive relation are manipulable according to Kelly’s
extension.2 However, it is it well-known that (quasi-transitive) rationalizability by itself
is unduly restrictive (see, e.g., Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein, 1972). As a consequence,
Kelly (1977) concludes his paper by contemplating that “one plausible interpretation
of such a theorem is that, rather than demonstrating the impossibility of reasonable
strategy-proof social choice functions, it is part of a critique of the regularity [ratio-
nalizability] conditions” and Barbera` (1977a) states that “whether a nonrationalizable
collective choice rule exists which is not manipulable and always leads to nonempty
choices for nonempty finite issues is an open question.” Also referring to nonrationaliz-
2Barbera` (1977a) actually uses an extension that is even weaker than that of Kelly (1977).
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able choice functions, Kelly (1977) writes: “it is an open question how far nondictatorship
can be strengthened in this sort of direction and still avoid impossibility results.” The
condition of rationalizability has been significantly weakened in subsequent impossibil-
ity results (MacIntyre and Pattanaik, 1981; Bandyopadhyay, 1982, 1983b). At the same
time, it has been noted that more positive results can be obtained for antisymmetric
(i.e., linear) individual preferences. In particular, it was shown that the omninomina-
tion rule (Ga¨rdenfors, 1976), the Pareto rule (Feldman, 1979a,b), the Condorcet rule
(Ga¨rdenfors, 1976; Nehring, 2000), and the top cycle (MacIntyre and Pattanaik, 1981;
Bandyopadhyay, 1983a; Sanver and Zwicker, 2012) are strategyproof when preference
are linear (see Remark 1 for more details about these SCFs). However, all these rules
are very indecisive and the latter two may even return Pareto-dominated alternatives.
In this paper, we propose a new variant of Maskin-monotonicity for set-valued SCFs
called set-monotonicity and show that all set-monotonic SCFs are strategyproof in suf-
ficiently rich subdomains of the linear domain. This covers all of the positive results
mentioned above and proves that some—much more discriminating—SCFs are strate-
gyproof. Set-monotonicity requires the invariance of choice sets under the weakening
of unchosen alternatives and is satisfied by the omninomination rule, the Pareto rule,
the Condorcet rule, and a handful of appealing Condorcet extensions such as top cycle,
the minimal covering set, and the bipartisan set. Since set-monotonicity coincides with
Maskin-monotonicity in the context of resolute SCFs, this characterization can be seen
as a set-valued generalization of the Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) theorem.
Nehring (2000) has proved a similar extension of the Muller-Sattherthwaite theorem
by showing that Maskin-monotonicity implies strategyproofness of set-valued SCFs in
a sense marginally weaker than that of Kelly (see also Remark 6).3 However, while
Maskin-monotonicity is prohibitive in the general domain, set-monotonicity is not. The
conditions themselves are independent, but we show that Maskin-montonicity implies
set-monotonicity when assuming independence of unchosen alternatives.
We conclude the paper with a number of remarks concerning group-strategyproofness,
stronger preference extensions, weak preferences, weaker domain conditions, and strate-
gic abstention.
2. Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents, A a finite and nonempty set of alternatives,
and L the set of all linear (i.e., complete, transitive, and antisymmetric) preference
relations over A. For Ri ∈ L , x Ri y denotes that agent i values alternative x at least
as much as alternative y. We write Pi for the strict part of Ri, i.e., x Pi y if x Ri y but
not y Ri x. The (strict) lower contour set of alternative x with respect to Pi is denoted
by L(x,Ri) = {y ∈ A : x Pi y}. For convenience, we will represent preference relations
3According to Nehring’s definition, a manipulator is only better off if he strictly prefers all alternatives
in the new choice set to all alternatives in the original choice set. For linear preferences, the two
definitions only differ in whether there can be a single alternative at the intersection of both choice
sets or not.
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as comma-separated lists. For example, a Pi b Pi c will be written as Ri : a, b, c. Two
distinct alternatives x and y are adjacent in Ri if there is no z with x Pi z Pi y.
A (Cartesian) domain of preference profiles D is defined as D =
∏
i∈N Di ⊆ L
N .
The maximal domain L N will be referred to as the general domain. We say that R′′
lies in the comprehensive closure of R and R′ if for all i ∈ N , Ri ∩ R
′
i ⊆ R
′′
i . A
domain D is comprehensive if for all R,R′ ∈ D and R′′ ∈ L N such that R′′ lies in the
comprehensive closure of R and R′, R′′ ∈ D (Nehring, 2000). For example, the domain
of all linear extensions of a fixed partial order is comprehensive. For a given preference
profile R ∈ D , R−i = (R1, . . . , Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . , Rn) denotes the vector of all preference
relations except that of agent i. An alternative x ∈ A is called a Condorcet winner if
|{i ∈ N : x Pi y}| > n/2 for all y ∈ A \ {x}.
Our central object of study are social choice functions. A social choice function (SCF)
is a function f that maps a preference profile R ∈ D to a nonempty subset of alternatives
f(R). f is resolute if |f(R)| = 1 for all R ∈ D . A Condorcet extension is an SCF that
uniquely selects a Condorcet winner whenever one exists.
2.1. Monotonicity
We will consider three variants of monotonicity: a weak standard notion and two
strengthenings, one of which was proposed by Maskin (1999) and one of which is new to
this paper. For a given preference profile R, an agent i, and two adjacent alternatives
x, y such that y Pi x, R
i:(x,y) denotes the preference profile in which agent i swapped
alternatives x and y and that is otherwise identical to R.
Definition 1. Let R,R′ ∈ D , i ∈ N , and x, y ∈ A such that R′ = Ri:(x,y). Then, SCF f
satisfies monotonicity, Maskin-monotonicity, or set-monotonicity, if
x ∈ f(R) implies x ∈ f(R′), (monotonicity)
z ∈ f(R) and y ∈ A \ {z} implies z ∈ f(R′), or (Maskin-monotonicity)
Z = f(R) and y ∈ A \ Z implies Z = f(R′), respectively. (set-monotonicity)
The intuitive meaning of these definitions is as follows. An SCF satisfies monotonicity
if a chosen alternative remains in the choice set when it is strengthened with respect to
another alternative; it satisfies Maskin-monotonicity if a chosen alternative remains in
the choice set when weakening another alternative; and it satisfies set-monotonicity if
the choice set is invariant under the weakening of unchosen alternatives.45
Clearly, Maskin-monotonicity implies monotonicity and, as will be shown in Propo-
sition 2, set-monotonicity also implies monotonicity. Despite the similar appearance,
set-monotonicity is logically independent of Maskin-monotonicity. Set-monotonicity has
4Sanver and Zwicker (2012) study monotonicity properties for set-valued SCFs in general. None of the
properties they consider is equivalent to set-monotonicity.
5Note that set-monotonicity is in conflict with decisiveness. For instance, non-trivial set-monotonic
SCFs cannot satisfy the (rather strong) positive responsiveness condition introduced by Barbera`
(1977b).
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a stronger antecedent and a stronger consequence. For example, consider a comprehen-
sive single-agent domain consisting of the relations R1 and R
′
1 given by
R1 : a, b, c, and
R′1 : b, a, c.
If we define SCF f by letting f((R1)) = {c} and f((R
′
1)) = {b, c}, f satisfies Maskin-
monotonicity, but violates set-monotonicity. If, on the other hand, we define f by
letting f((R1)) = {a, b, c} and f((R
′
1)) = {b, a}, f satisfies set-monotonicity, but violates
Maskin-monotonicity.
Set-monotonicity coincides with Maskin-monotonicity in the context of resolute SCFs.
Under the condition of independence of unchosen alternatives which is satisfied by var-
ious set-valued SCFs, set-monotonicity is weaker than Maskin-monotonicity. Moreover,
set-monotonicity implies independence of unchosen alternatives. Independence of uncho-
sen alternatives was introduced by Laslier (1997) in the context of tournament solutions
(as “independence of the losers”) and requires that the choice set is invariant under
modifications of the preference profile with respect to unchosen alternatives.
Definition 2. An SCF f satisfies independence of unchosen alternatives (IUA) if for
all R,R′ ∈ D such that Ri|{x,y} = R
′
i|{x,y} for all x ∈ f(R), y ∈ A, and i ∈ N ,
f(R) = f(R′).
Proposition 1. Maskin-monotonicity and IUA imply set-monotonicity.
Proof. Let f be an SCF, R ∈ D , i ∈ N , x ∈ A, y ∈ A \ f(R), and R′ = Ri:(x,y).
Maskin-monotonicity implies that f(R) ⊆ f(R′). Now, assume for contradiction that
there is some x′ ∈ f(R′) \ f(R). Since x′ 6∈ f(R), it follows from Maskin-monotonicity
that there is some y′ ∈ A that is strengthened with respect to x′ when moving from R′
to R. Hence, R′ = Ri:(x
′,y′), x′ = x, and y′ = y. Since x = x′ 6∈ f(R) and y 6∈ f(R) by
assumption, IUA implies that f(R) = f(R′), a contradiction.
Proposition 2. Set-monotonicity implies monotonicity and IUA.
Proof. We first show that set-monotonicity implies monotonicity. Let f be a set-
monotonic SCF, R ∈ D , i ∈ N , x ∈ f(R), y ∈ A, and R′ ∈ Ri:(x,y). Clearly, in case
y 6∈ f(R), set-monotonicity implies that f(R′) = f(R) and thus x ∈ f(R′). If, on the
other hand, y ∈ f(R), assume for contradiction that x 6∈ f(R′). When moving from R′
to R, y is strengthened with respect to outside alternative x, and set-monotonicity again
implies that f(R) = f(R′), a contradiction. The fact that set-monotonicity implies IUA
is straightforward from the definitions.
2.2. Strategyproofness
An SCF is manipulable if an agent can misrepresent his preferences in order to obtain a
more preferred outcome. Whether one choice set is preferred to another depends on how
the preferences over individual alternatives are to be extended to sets of alternatives.
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In the absence of information about the tie-breaking mechanism that eventually picks a
single alternative from any choice set, preferences over choice sets are obtained by the
conservative extension R̂i (Kelly, 1977), where for any pair of nonempty sets X,Y ⊆ A
and preference relation Ri,
X R̂i Y if and only if x Ri y for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
Clearly, in all but the simplest cases, R̂i is incomplete, i.e., many pairs of choice sets are
incomparable. The strict part of R̂i is denoted by P̂i, i.e., X P̂i Y if and only if X R̂i Y
and x Pi y for at least one pair of x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . For linear preferences, X P̂i Y if
and only if x Pi y for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y with x 6= y. Hence, |X ∩ Y | ≤ 1.
Definition 3. An SCF is Kelly-strategyproof if there exist no R,R′ ∈ D and i ∈ N
with R−i = R
′
−i such that f(R
′) P̂i f(R).
Kelly-strategyproofness is a very weak notion of strategyproofness. Nevertheless, most
well-known SCFs such as plurality, Borda’s rule, Copeland’s rule, Slater’s rule, or plu-
rality with runoff fail to be Kelly-strategyproof in the general domain (see, e.g., Taylor,
2005, Theorem 2.2.2).
Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) have shown that, in the general domain, a resolute
SCF is strategyproof if and only if it satisfies Maskin-monotonicity. Unfortunately, as
famously shown by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), only dictatorial or im-
posing resolute SCFs satisfy Maskin-monotonicity in the general domain. However,
Maskin-monotonicity still implies strategyproofness of resolute SCFs in many restricted
domains of interest (see, e.g., Klaus and Bochet, 2013), including the class of compre-
hensive domains considered in this paper (Nehring, 2000).
3. The Result
Theorem 1. Every set-monotonic SCF on a comprehensive domain is Kelly-
strategyproof.
Proof. Let f be a set-monotonic SCF and D a comprehensive domain. We first show
that set-monotonicity is equivalent to a version of set-monotonicity that is not restricted
to pairwise swaps of adjacent alternatives. Rather, we require that choice sets may only
change if an alternative is removed from a lower contour set of a chosen alternative. For
R,R′ ∈ D and i ∈ N with R−i = R
′
−i, we say that R
′ is an f -improvement over R if
for all x ∈ f(R), L(x, Pi) ⊆ L(x, P
′
i ). We claim that if R
′ is an f -improvement over R,
then f(R′) = f(R). The statement can be shown by induction on d(R,R′) = |Ri \ R
′
i|.
The induction basis is trivially satisfied because R = R′ if d(R,R′) = 0. Assume the
statement is true for all R and R′ with d(R,R′) < k and consider R and R′ such
that d(R,R′) = k. Since R 6= R′, there have to be two alternatives x, y ∈ A such
that x Pi y and y P
′
i x. Due to the transitivity of Ri and R
′
i, we may furthermore
assume that x and y are adjacent in Ri. (However, x and y need not be adjacent in
R′i.) x 6∈ f(R) because otherwise R
′ is not an f -improvement over R. Set-monotonicity
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implies that f(Ri:(y,x)) = f(R) and comprehensiveness that Ri:(y,x) ∈ D . It follows
from d(Ri:(y,x), R′) < k and the induction hypothesis that f(Ri:(y,x)) = f(R′). Hence,
f(R) = f(R′),
Now, for the proof of the statement of the theorem, assume for contradiction that f is
not Kelly-strategyproof. Then, there have to be R,R′ ∈ D , and i ∈ N with R−i = R
′
−i
such that f(R′) P̂i f(R). The latter obviously entails that f(R) 6= f(R
′). The proof
idea is to find some R∗ in the comprehensive closure of R and R′ (and hence in D) such
that R∗ is an f -improvement over both R and R′, which implies that f(R) = f(R′), a
contradiction.
Let m ∈ f(R′) such that L(m,Pi)∩ f(R′) = ∅. In other words, m is the alternative in
f(R′) that is ranked lowest in Ri. Note that, if f(R) ∩ f(R
′) 6= ∅, then f(R) ∩ f(R′) =
{m}. Next, we partition A into the strict lower contour set and the upper contour set
of m with respect to Ri, i.e., L = L(m,Pi) and U = A \ L and define a new preference
profile by letting
R∗i = Ri|L ∪R
′
i|U ∪ {(x, y) : x ∈ U, y ∈ L},
i.e., the upper part of R∗i is ranked as in R
′
i and the lower part as in Ri, and R
∗ =
(R−i, R
∗
i ) = (R
′
−i, R
∗
i ).
R∗ lies in the comprehensive closure of R and R′ (and hence in D) because for all
x, y ∈ A with x R∗i y, we have x Ri y or x R
′
i y. For x, y ∈ U , this follows from
R∗i |U = R
′
i|U ; for x, y ∈ L, from R
∗
i |L = Ri|L; and for x ∈ U, y ∈ L from (x, y) ∈ Ri.
R∗ is an f -improvement over R because f(R) ⊆ L∪{m} and L(x, P ∗i ) = L(x, Pi) for all
x ∈ L and L(m,P ∗i ) ⊇ L(m,Pi) = L. Set-monotonicity then implies that f(R
∗) = f(R).
R∗ is an f -improvement over R′ because f(R′) ⊆ U and L(x, P ∗i ) = L(x, P
′
i ) ∪ L for all
x ∈ U . Hence, set-monotonicity implies that f(R∗) = f(R′) 6= f(R), a contradiction.
We conclude the paper with nine remarks.
Remark 1 (Set-monotonic SCFs). There are a number of rather attractive SCFs
that satisfy set-monotonicity in the general domain L N . In particular, every monotonic
SCF that satisfies the strong superset property (SSP) (i.e., choice sets are invariant
under the removal of unchosen alternatives) also satisfies set-monotonicity.6 Prominent
Condorcet extensions that satisfy both SSP and monotonicity include the Condorcet
rule (which selects a Condorcet winner whenever one exists and returns all alternatives
otherwise), the top cycle (also known as weak closure maximality, GETCHA, or the Smith
set) (Good, 1971; Smith, 1973; Bordes, 1976; Sen, 1977; Schwartz, 1986), the minimal
covering set (Dutta, 1990), the bipartisan set (Laffond et al., 1993) and variations of
6The strong superset property goes back to early work by Chernoff (1954) (where it was called
postulate 5∗) and is also known as α̂ (Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011), the attention filter axiom
(Masatlioglu et al., 2012), and outcast (Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995). The term strong superset
property was first used by Bordes (1979). We refer to Monjardet (2008) for a more thorough discus-
sion of the origins of this condition.
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these (see Laslier, 1997; Dutta and Laslier, 1999; Laslier, 2000; Brandt, 2011).78 Two
other SCFs that satisfy set-monotonicity are the Pareto rule and the omninomination
rule (which returns all alternatives that are top-ranked by at least one agent).
Remark 2 (Coarsenings of Kelly-strategyproof SCFs). For two SCFs f, f ′, we
say that f is a coarsening of f ′ if f ′(R) ⊆ f(R) for all R ∈ D . Kelly’s preference
extension has the useful property that X P̂i Y implies X
′ P̂i Y
′ for all non-singleton
subsets X ′ ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Y . Hence, every coarsening f of a Kelly-strategyproof SCF
f ′ is Kelly-strategyproof if f(R) = f ′(R) whenever |f ′(R)| = 1. As a consequence, the
(McKelvey) uncovered set (see Duggan, 2013), a coarsening of the minimal covering set
that returns singletons if and only if there is a Condorcet winner, is Kelly-strategyproof,
even though it violates set-monotonicity.9 In light of these comments, it seems interesting
to try to identify inclusion-minimal Kelly-strategyproof SCFs.
Remark 3 (Group-strategyproofness). The proof of Theorem 1 can be straightfor-
wardly extended to show that no group of agents can misstate their preferences in order
to obtain a more preferred outcome.
Remark 4 (Fishburn-strategyproofness). It has been shown in other work that
Theorem 1 does not carry over to slightly more complete set extensions due to
Fishburn and Ga¨rdenfors (Brandt and Brill, 2011). In fact, Pareto-optimality and
Fishburn-strategyproofness are already incompatible within the class of majoritarian
SCFs (Brandt and Geist, 2014).
Remark 5 (Necessary conditions). It seems like there are no natural necessary
conditions for Kelly-strategyproofness as long as preferences are linear. For example,
any SCF f such that |f(R)| > (|A|/2)+1 for all R ∈ D satisfies Kelly-strategyproofness
simply because no pair of resulting choice sets is comparable. This observation allows
one to easily construct Kelly-strategyproof SCFs that violate set-monotonicity, Maskin-
monotonicity, or any other reasonable form of monotonicity.
Remark 6 (Weak preferences). When individual preference relations do not have
to be antisymmetric, a number of results mentioned in the introduction rule out the
possibility of reasonable Kelly-strategyproof SCFs. A new result of this kind, which
strengthens some existing theorems, is given as Theorem 2 in the Appendix.
7Remarkably, the robustness of the minimal covering set and the bipartisan set with respect to strategic
manipulation also extends to agenda manipulation. The strong superset property precisely states that
an SCF is resistant to adding and deleting losing alternatives (see also the discussion by Bordes, 1983).
Moreover, both SCFs are composition-consistent, i.e., they are strongly resistant to the introduction
of clones (Laffond et al., 1996). Scoring rules like plurality and Borda’s rule are prone to both
types of agenda manipulation (Laslier, 1996; Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011) as well as to strategic
manipulation.
8Another prominent Condorcet extension—the tournament equilibrium set (Schwartz, 1990)—was con-
jectured to satisfy SSP and monotonicity for almost 20 years. This conjecture was recently disproved
by Brandt et al. (2013). In fact, it can be shown that the tournament equilibrium set as well as the
related minimal extending set (Brandt, 2011) can be Kelly-manipulated.
9For generalized strategyproofness as defined by Nehring (2000) (see Remark 6), the second condition
is not required and every coarsening of a strategyproof SCF is strategyproof.
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The proof of Theorem 1 can be adapted for weak preferences to show that set-
monotonicity implies Nehring’s generalized strategyproofness, a weakening of Kelly-
strategyproofness (Nehring, 2000).10 Generalized strategyproofness is defined by letting
agent i prefer set X to set Y if and only if x Pi y for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
Remark 7 (Matching markets). Theorem 1 can be straightforwardly extended to
domains in which the indifference relation is fixed for each agent. This is, for example,
the case in matching markets where each agent is typically assumed to be indifferent
between all matchings in which his assignment is identical.
Remark 8 (Connected domains). Theorem 1 does not hold for a weakening of
comprehensiveness, which Nehring (2000) refers to as connectedness. A domain D is
connected if for all i ∈ N , Ri, R
′
i ∈ Di, the following holds: if there is some R
′′
i ∈ L \
{Ri, R
′
i} with R∩R
′ ⊆ R′′, then there is some R′′i ∈ Di \{Ri, R
′
i} with R∩R
′ ⊆ R′′. The
following single-agent SCF f , defined on a connected—but not comprehensive—domain
of size three, has been adapted from Nehring (2000) and satisfies set-monotonicity while
it violates Kelly-strategyproofness:
R1 : a, b, c, d, f((R1)) = {c},
R′1 : a, b, d, c, f((R
′
1)) = {a, b, c, d},
R′′1 : b, a, d, c, f((R
′′
1)) = {b}.
Remark 9 (Strategic abstention). Fishburn and Brams (1983) introduced a partic-
ularly natural variant of strategic manipulation where agents obtain a more preferred
outcome by abstaining the election. Moulin (1988) has shown that every resolute Con-
dorcet extension can be manipulated in this way and thus suffers from the so-called
no-show paradox. However, Moulin’s proof strongly relies on resoluteness. If preferences
over sets are given by Kelly’s extension, set-valued Condorcet extension that satisfy
Kelly-strategyproofness also cannot be manipulated by abstention under very mild con-
ditions. This is, for instance, the case for all SCFs whose outcome only depends on
pairwise majority margins (which covers all of the Condorcet extensions mentioned in
Remark 1) because any manipulation by abstention can be turned into a manipulation
by strategic misrepresentation.11
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A. Appendix
For the domain of transitive and complete (but not necessarily antisymmetric) prefer-
ence relations RN , we show that all Condorcet extensions are Kelly-manipulable. This
strengthens Theorem 3 by Ga¨rdenfors (1976) and Theorem 8.1.2 by Taylor (2005), who
showed the same statement for a weaker notion of manipulability and a weaker notion of
Condorcet winners, respectively. When assuming that pairwise choices are made accord-
ing to majority rule, this also strengthens Theorems 1 and 2 by MacIntyre and Pattanaik
(1981). However, our construction requires that the number of agents is linear in the
number of alternatives.
Theorem 2. No Condorcet extension is Kelly-strategyproof in domain RN when there
are more than two alternatives.
Proof. Let A = {a1, . . . , am} with m ≥ 3 and consider the following preference profile R
with 3m agents. In the representation below, sets denote indifference classes of the
agents.
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R1, R2 : {a2, . . . , am}, a1
R3, R4 : {a1, a3, . . . , am}, a2
...
...
R2m−1, R2m : {a1, . . . , am−1}, am
R2m+1 : {a3, . . . , am}, a1, a2
...
...
R3m−1 : {a1, . . . , am−2}, am−1, am
R3m : {a2, . . . , am−1}, am, a1
For every alternative ai, there are two agents who prefer every alternative to ai and are
otherwise indifferent. Moreover, for every alternative ai there is one agent who prefers
every alternative except ai+1 to ai, ranks ai+1 below ai, and is otherwise indifferent.
Since f(R) yields a nonempty choice set, there has to be some ai ∈ f(R). Due to
the symmetry of the preference profile, we may assume without loss of generality that
a2 ∈ f(R). Now, let
R′3, R
′
4 : a1, {a3, . . . , am}, a2
and define R′ = (R−3, R
′
3) and R
′′ = (R′−4, R
′
4). That is, R
′ is identical to R, except
that agent 3 lifted a1 on top and R
′′ is identical to R′, except that agent 4 lifted a1 on
top. Observe that f(R′′) = {a1} because a1 is the Condorcet winner in R
′′.
In case that a2 6∈ f(R
′), agent 3 can manipulate as follows. Suppose R is the true
preference profile. Then, the least favorable alternative of agent 3 is chosen (possibly
among other alternatives). He can misstate his preferences as in R′ such that a2 is not
chosen. Since he is indifferent between all other alternatives, f(R′) P̂3 f(R).
If a2 ∈ f(R
′), agent 4 can manipulate similarly. Suppose R′ is the true preference
profile. Again, the least favorable alternative of agent 4 is chosen. By misstating his
preferences as in R′′, he can assure that one of his preferred alternatives, namely a1,
is selected exclusively because it is the Condorcet winner in R′′. Hence, f(R′′) P̂ ′4
f(R′).
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